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ANSELM AGAINST MCCANN ON GOD AND SIN: 
FURTHER DISCUSSION
Katherin A. Rogers
Hugh McCann argues that God wills human sin, that humans are nonethe-
less significantly free, and that his position provides a satisfying theodicy of 
sin. I defend an Anselmian view: Although God causes the existence of all 
that exists, He does not produce sin. Human beings are the ultimate sources 
of their sinning, which sinning should not happen. McCann rejoins that my 
position is incoherent and that my criticisms are not well taken. I respond, 
clarifying Anselm’s understanding of human freedom, revisiting and de-
fending my previous criticisms, and arguing that in practice McCann’s posi-
tion is a poor fit for the Christian life.
Hugh McCann argues that God wills human acts of sin, that human beings 
are nonetheless free in a robust enough way to ground moral responsibility, 
and that his position provides a satisfying theodicy of sin. I have responded 
that McCann’s position implies that God is an “unloving deceiver,” so his 
theodicy fails and the alternative view offered by Anselm of Canterbury 
is preferable; although God causes the existence of all things that exist, it 
is logically impossible that God produce sin, and human beings are free 
enough to be the ultimate cause of their sinning, which sinning really and 
absolutely should not happen.1 McCann rejoins, in a recent paper, that the 
position I impute to Anselm is incoherent, and that my criticisms of his, 
McCann’s, view are not well taken.2 The question of whether or not God 
is the ultimate source of human sins seems to me a fundamental one in 
the philosophy of religion, with broad and deep theoretical and practical 
consequences for the Christian believer. In the present paper I hope to re-
spond to McCann, clarifying Anselm’s understanding of human freedom, 
revisiting and defending my previous criticisms, and trying to develop 
some of the practical consequences which follow from our two opposing 
views. Each view is internally consistent, and each has its advantages and 
its drawbacks, but where theory meets practice, McCann’s position is a poor 
fit for the Christian life.
1“God is Not the Author of Sin: An Anselmian Response to McCann,” Faith and Philoso-
phy 24 (2007): 300–310, in response to McCann’s “The Author of Sin?” Faith and Philosophy 
22 (2005): 144–159.
2“God, Sin, and Rogers on Anselm: A Reply,” Faith and Philosophy 26 (2009): 420–431.
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McCann’s Position
McCann holds that his view is roughly the same as that held by Saints 
Augustine and Thomas Aquinas.3 I suspect that he may be correct con-
cerning the long and distinguished pedigree of his position.4 Let me first 
offer a very quick sketch of McCann’s understanding of this traditional 
view as it appears in his most recent paper and then we can move to An-
selm’s (and my) disagreement. McCann notes the classical theist position, 
shared by Augustine and Aquinas and Anselm, that all that has being of 
any kind derives that being through God’s creative act. Does God “create” 
sin? Regarding free choice and sin McCann quotes Aquinas,
[E]very being, whatever the manner of its being, must be derived from the 
first being. . . . [Thus] every being in act is reduced to the First Act, viz., God, 
as to its cause, who is act by his essence. Therefore God is the cause of every 
action, in so far as it is an action.—But sin denotes a being and an action 
with a defect. But this defect is from a created cause, viz., free choice, as fall-
ing away from the order of the First Cause. Consequently, this defect is not 
reduced to God as its cause, but to free choice; just as the defect of limping 
is reduced to a crooked leg as its cause, but not to the power of locomotion, 
which nevertheless causes whatever there is of motion in the limping. Ac-
cordingly, God is the cause of the act of sin; and yet he is not the cause of 
sin, because he does not cause the act to have a defect.5
God is the source of everything that exists, including every action. But 
how can He be the cause of the act of sin and yet not be the cause of sin? 
Sometimes it is said that God is not the cause of sin since evil is simply 
a privation of the good that ought to be there, and mere absence has no 
cause. This is insufficient, though. If an agent could be absolved of causing 
sin because the evil of sin is an absence, then the human sinner ought 
to be equally acquitted. More needs to be said. And here the analogy of 
limping is helpful, but it is also puzzling. It makes the useful distinction 
between the “power,” what supplies the motion, the causal efficacy, on 
the one hand, and the element where the motion “goes wrong” on the 
other. But the puzzle lies in locating the source of the defect. If the limp-
ing is analogous to the sinful choice of the will, then the defective leg is 
analogous to the defective will in the created agent. And here “defective” 
does not mean simply “limited” but rather “not as it ought to be” or “not 
properly functioning.” A well-functioning leg might be limited—it’s just 
a leg, after all—but the leg which inevitably produces the limp is a badly 
functioning leg. The pressing question then is; how and why is the created 
will defective? If we take the paradigm of a free choice, the first human 
sin, the claim would seem to be that Adam’s will was defective before he 
3Ibid., 420–421.
4I have argued that Augustine is a theist compatibilist in my Anselm on Freedom (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), 31–52.
5McCann, “God, Sin, and Rogers on Anselm,” 420–421. ST I-II, Q.79, Art. 2. A standard 
and convenient English translation is available online at http://www.newadvent.org/summa.
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ever sinned. (The defective leg comes before the limp temporally and logi-
cally.) That means that he was created originally by God with a defective 
will. And if the defect of the will explains the sin, as the passage quoted 
from Thomas seems to suggest, then the sin is due to God’s making Adam 
with a defective will and supplying the motive power for the will to act. 
In that case the first sin looks to be inevitable and ultimately traceable to 
God.6 Was God incapable of making a created agent with a non-defective 
will? That seems to limit His power. Did He choose to make Adam with 
a defective will, though He could have made him (or some other human 
agent) with a well functioning will? Or is the limping analogy misleading 
and best forgotten?
McCann does not directly address these questions motivated by the 
quote from Thomas, but he does attribute human sinning to God in a way 
that Anselm cannot allow. Though Thomas says that God is the first cause, 
McCann prefers not to say that God is the cause of our choices. He writes, 
“our doings are not the causal product of God’s will but rather its content 
or embodiment.”7 There are modern usages of “cause” which insist upon 
criteria like temporal priority which are inapplicable to God’s activity, and 
perhaps that is the reason McCann eschews the term. So as not to beg any 
questions, I will use the term “produce” and its cognates where I explicitly 
intend the term to cover God’s immediate creative activity. So, for exam-
ple, my keyboard exists at this moment. I take it that it exists because God 
is immediately keeping it in being. The existing keyboard is a “content 
or embodiment” of God’s will. God “produces” my keyboard. (Like the 
term “create,” there is equivocation—or at least analogical usage—when 
“produce” is applied to God and creatures. Creatures never “create” or 
“produce” as God does. At best they move existent things around. They 
never bring things into being ex nihilo.) So, on McCann’s view, God pro-
duces created agents complete with their choices. Should the created agent 
sin, God is producing the agent with the sin. God wills that the agent exist 
and that he be sinning.
But isn’t sin to choose against the will of God? How can God will that 
the created agent sin? McCann appeals to a distinction found in Aquinas 
between God’s antecedent and His consequent will. As McCann por-
trays it, God antecedently wills general principles, like “Do not commit 
adultery!” but consequently, “that is, what he wills all things considered” 
God wills everything that actually happens.8 Sin is disobedience to the 
commands expressed in God’s antecedent will, so it is indeed choosing 
against the will of God. But the sinful choices are willed by God through 
His consequent will. Why? McCann proposes a theodicy of sin in which 
6This sounds very like Augustine’s analysis of the original situation of the angels. They 
could not persevere in the good without extra help from God. To some He gave that extra 
help and to others He didn’t. Rogers, Anselm on Freedom, 43–52. 
7McCann “God, Sin, and Rogers on Anselm,” 425.
8Ibid.,” 426.
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he argues that sin is necessary for the achievement of certain goods. I will 
address this theodicy later in the paper.
Anselm’s Alternative
On McCann’s understanding of the traditional view of Augustine and 
Aquinas, God wills that the sinner sin. Anselm finds this unbearable 
for two reasons. First, if God (per impossibile in Anselm’s view) brings it 
about that the agent chooses sinfully, then the sinner is not free in a robust 
enough sense to ground blame. This entails the corollary that if it is God 
who brings it about that the agent chooses well rather than sinfully, then 
the agent is not free enough to be praiseworthy. But then the agent is not a 
true imago Dei.9 Second, as Anselm understands it, sin should not happen. 
Though God permits people to sin, He wants them to behave well. To sin 
is to fail to will what God wills that you will. So it is logically impossible 
that God should will that the agent sin.10 Chapter 8 of Anselm’s De Veritate 
might appear to contradict this point. Here Anselm is concerned to argue 
that sometimes the very same event both ought and ought not to happen. 
For example, suppose someone deserves a beating. It might be the case 
that another person, who does not have the proper authority to beat him, 
might administer the beating. In this case, the beating ought to occur, 
because the one being beaten deserves it, but it ought not to occur because 
the one administering the beating is not the one who should be doing it. 
I do not believe Anselm has contradicted himself. Note, first, that he is 
extremely careful throughout the chapter to repeat the disjunction—there 
is what God actively does (facit) on the one hand or what God permits 
(permittit) on the other. Knowing that it is logically impossible that God 
should will that someone sin, we can analyze the beating case this way: 
God wills that the beating happen, insofar as He wills the justice of the 
deserved punishment. He wills that the beating not happen insofar as He 
wills that created agents act within the limits of their appropriate author-
ity. He wills to permit the one who should not administer the beating to 
do so for two reasons. First, He permits bad free choices as a necessary 
part of the mechanism which allows for good free choices. Second, the 
beating was deserved. This case (and other examples in Chapter 8) might 
suggest that God would permit the bad choice only if some consequent 
good were to be derived from it, but I think this would be extracting too 
much from the examples.
To Anselm’s first point concerning the requirements for freedom, 
McCann holds that the created agent can be free with “legitimate and 
authentic moral freedom” if it meets three conditions: “that the decision 
9Rogers, Anselm on Freedom, 56–60, 76–78. A good proof text for this point is Cur Deus 
Homo 2.10 where Anselm says that the good angels are to be praised “due to the fact that, 
in a way, they have it from themselves that they are [now] unable to sin; in this they are, to 
some extent, similar to God, who has whatever He has from Himself (a se)” (my translation 
from the Schmitt edition of Anselm’s Opera Omnia, Vol.II, p.107, ll.27–29). 
10Rogers, Anselm on Freedom, 89. See chapter 8 of Anselm’s De libertate arbitrii.
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or willing in question not arise from some independent event by nomic 
causation, that it exhibit the spontaneity of agency, and that it be intrinsi-
cally intentional.”11And McCann holds that, although the created agent, 
complete with his act of willing, is immediately and directly produced by 
God, these criteria can be met. The choice is not the effect of some event 
rooted in deterministic, natural causal laws (if that, or something relevant-
ly similar, is what “nomic causation” means here). It exhibits “spontaneity 
of agency” insofar as an agent may “feel [he is] a genuine source of control 
and spontaneity in the universe.”12 And it is intentional, that is, it follows 
from deliberation. Anselm might well endorse each of these criteria.13 But 
the Anselmian will hold that they are not sufficient.
Why does the libertarian insist that we cannot be free in the right way if 
all of our choices are the product of nomic causation? Usually the response 
goes something like this: If my choices are ultimately the products of some 
thing or event outside myself, such that I could not choose other than this 
thing or event makes me choose, then the ultimate responsibility does 
not lie with me, but with what ultimately caused the choice. This is true 
even if things or events “within” me, such as my judgements, desires, and 
deliberation, are part of the causal chain stretching between the factors 
outside of me and my choice. But if I do not bear ultimate responsibility, 
then I am not free in the way required for praise and blame. If this is why 
nomic causation conflicts with freedom, then it is not only nomic causa-
tion which conflicts with freedom. We might deny that choices are nomi-
cally produced and still hold that the choosing agent is not free. Suppose, 
for example, that a mad neurosurgeon, through a non-determined act of 
free agency, takes control of my brain. (A machine which produces non-
determined effects—perhaps it is moved this way or that depending on the 
non-determined behavior of sub-atomic particles—would suit the example 
equally well.) This mad neurosurgeon implants in me desires, judgements, 
and deliberative processes, such that I can choose only what he causes me 
to choose. In that case, it is not really up to me what I choose. Though my 
choice is not nomically caused in that it is not the product of deterministic 
natural processes, nonetheless I do not have ultimate responsibility for my 
choice, and I am not free in the right way.14 McCann may point out that 
God’s productive activity is not like that of the mad neurosurgeon. The 
mad neurosurgeon steps in from outside to manipulate the agent, whereas 
11McCann “God, Sin, and Rogers on Anselm,” 425. These criteria are developed more 
fully in McCann’s “Sovereignty and Freedom: A Reply to Rowe,” Faith and Philosophy 18 
(2001): 110–116.
12McCann “Sovereignty and Freedom,” 113.
13There might be a question about the “spontaneity.” Anselm would hold that the agent 
must be a source of spontaneous activity (Rogers, Anselm on Freedom, 76–78), but it is not so 
clear that the agent must feel that his choices are “from himself.” Someone who had never 
considered the question of free will, or who was a devout determinist, might be free with-
out feeling free. And, on the other hand, someone whose choices were caused by something 
outside himself might feel that his choices were from himself.
14Robert Kane, The Significance of Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 64–71.
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God is the source of the very being of the agent, complete with his choices. 
But the relevant similarity remains: if it is up to someone else what choices 
I make in such a way that I cannot choose other than this person brings it 
about that I choose, then I am not responsible or free.
My choices must truly originate with me. But how is that possible in an 
Anselmian universe in which all that has ontological status is from God? 
If the “act of sin” is any sort of thing—any being with ontological status— 
then must it not come from the source of all being, from God? What I 
take Anselm to be saying is that the “choice” per se is not a thing. Prima 
facie this may seem a bizarre claim. Surely choices are things of a sort. 
They can be temporally located and serve as the subjects of sentences. 
We might say, for example, “Her choice to cheat happened during the test 
yesterday.” And surely Anselm would have seen that! Let me try to spell 
out and develop my understanding of the Anselmian position regarding 
the ontological status of choice.15
Take the example of Bill, the adulterer (and bracket worries about origi-
nal sin for the sake of the argument).16 We all pursue what we desire, says 
Anselm, and all desires come from God. (Anselm uses velle and voluntas 
and their cognates in a number of different senses. Sometimes “desire,” the 
verb or the noun, seems the best translation. For our purposes here “desire” 
stands for the various intentions and other motivating factors that lead to 
choice.) Suppose married Bill desires sex with this particular woman who 
is not his wife. Now suppose this is all he desires—no other thought is in 
his mind. (To be properly Anselmian, add that this fixation is not the prod-
uct of his own past free choices.17) An act of willing in Anselm’s system is 
just the pursuing of an occurrent desire.18 But not every act of willing is a 
free choice. The act of willing is not a free choice unless there are robustly 
open options. Bill, right now in the condition of desiring only sex with this 
woman, is effectively willing adultery. Anselm would have it that Bill is 
not blameworthy, in the sense of having committed some injustice or sin, 
because, in our hypothetical situation, he is simply pursuing the one, god-
given, desire he “has” to pursue given the nature of created agency.19 Bill, 
15McCann, “God, Sin, and Rogers on Anselm,” rightly, I now believe, faults my language 
when I speak of a created agent who can “create” a choice (422). In Anselm on Freedom I speak 
of the created agent having “primary agency” as opposed to “secondary agency” analo-
gous to primary (divine) causation and secondary (created) causation. I have come to regret 
this terminology. For one thing, if a previous act of creation is required to make a choice, 
this leads to an infinite regress. More importantly, neither Anselm nor I want to suggest 
that the created agent can bring a choice “into being” as God brings things into being. I am 
grateful to McCann for his well-taken criticism on this point.
16We can tell an Anselmian story about grace such that this example, as I will develop it, 
is consistent with the fallen condition.
17Rogers, Anselm on Freedom, 83–85.
18Ibid. 63–64, see the three meanings of voluntas.
19Anselm does not spell it out, but I take it that he would say essentially the same thing 
if Bill had two desires, but one was so much stronger than the other that the stronger one 
must succeed in moving Bill to action. Here Bill might deliberate and perhaps feel free and 
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his will, his desire, and his ultimately following the desire, insofar as these 
can be characterized as “things” or “powers,” are from God. Bill, in this 
case, is like the horse or dog which does will things based on desire, but 
does not have free will. Animals have wills and desires, says Anselm, and 
can even will rightly. But they cannot step back from their immediate de-
sires and choose to try to pursue only those desires which are appropriate, 
and so they are not free.20
Created freedom requires alternative possibilities. Thus God sometimes 
provides competing desires of which the satisfaction of one precludes the 
satisfaction of the other.21 Say that Bill desires sex with this woman who is 
not his wife, but also desires to control himself and behave properly. The 
former desire can be characterized as a “mere” benefit, while the latter, 
in Anselm’s terminology, is a desire for justice. And both are god-given. 
Bill, as he struggles to decide what to do, is effectively trying to pursue 
the two incompatible desires. In the end he will succeed in pursuing one, 
and following through on the one desire will mean the defeat of the other. 
And he, Bill, will be the one who succeeds in following one rather than 
the other. It is absolutely up to him which desire he follows. What makes 
this second scenario different from the first is that Bill follows through 
on one desire when he could have pursued the other. If Bill chooses adultery, 
he is blameworthy because he wills adultery rather than continence. If he 
chooses continence he is praiseworthy because he wills continence rather 
than adultery. But there is no thing “rather-than-ness” or, to invent a Latin 
barbarism, no potiusitas. (Anselm himself does not use the term.) Bill does 
not add to the sum of things or powers in the universe when, in the first 
scenario, he pursues his one desire, and he does not add to the sum of 
things or powers in the universe when, in the second scenario, he pursues 
one desire over another.
The claim here is that there is no separate event of choosing. In the lit-
erature a choice is often portrayed as an event where the agent is poised at 
a moment of stasis, then suddenly makes a choice. But this is not Anselm’s 
picture. A “motionless” agent cannot up and move itself. The agent cannot 
generate some new action ex nihilo. Moreover, in the literature, a choice is 
very often characterized as a unique and separate sort of doing, different 
from the having of desires. But this is what Anselm denies. The created 
agent cannot bring some new sort of activity into being—only God brings 
things into being. On the contrary, you will something when you desire 
it, and you choose something when you have conflicting desires and you 
pursue your desire for this, rather than pursuing your desire for that. 
That is, you pursue this one of the two incommensurate desires through to 
completion. Anselm even coins a term for this phenomenon, “pervelle,” to 
responsible, but Anselm’s understanding is that he really must have been able to choose 
other than he chooses.
20Rogers, Anselm on Freedom, 64.
21Ibid., 73–76.
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express the thought that one not only desires this rather than that, but one 
perseveres in desiring it through to completion.22 The choice, then, is not a 
new thing separate from the god-given desire.
The critic may say that there must be a difference between simply de-
siring something and actually choosing it. Without this distinction no one 
could resist temptation, since in order to resist temptation there must be 
desire, but not choosing. I respond that one may desire without choosing, 
just as one may drink without drinking to excess. But drinking to excess 
is a manner of drinking, and choosing can be analyzed as a manner of 
desiring . . . through to completion. Thus Anselm can maintain that ev-
erything in the free choice that exists—the agent, the faculty of will, the 
desires which move the will—all of these owe their existence to God. Still 
the pursuit of this over that is “up to” the agent in the right way due to the 
“rather-than-ness,” the potiusitas, which is not a thing or power or event at 
all. The choice is an event, in that it is a doing of the agent which happens 
at a time, but it is a “thin” event—it is just the success of the agent in pur-
suing this over that—and has no ontological status beyond that ascribed 
to the god-given elements involved.23
It seems to me that whether or not Anselm’s understanding is plausible 
here depends as much on experience as on metaphysics.24 Were it the case 
that we all experience choice as a unique and discrete event, different 
from following desire, there would be evidence against the Anselmian 
view. But it is not clear that we do. We might distinguish between mere-
ly “having” desire and “following” desire, but this would not introduce 
some new event, the choice. Little work has been done on the actual phe-
nomenology of choice, but try to remember the times you have struggled 
to make a decision. Did you reach a point of stasis where you suddenly 
engaged in a new sort of activity, the choosing? Do you remember there 
being more to choosing than going one way rather than the other? I am 
talking here about significant value choices where you were truly trying 
to pursue two desires, and not choices of indifference—such as chocolate 
or pistachio—where you might literally or figuratively flip a coin. Such 
flipping would, presumably, be a new act. And here it would the coin (or 
22De casu diaboli 3. I take Anselm’s coining of the term pervelle as good evidence that he 
did indeed entertain the view that I ascribe to him. I am more interested in the position 
than in the history, but I believe there is good reason for me not to take credit for this ex-
tremely clever move.
23I try to develop this thought at more length in “Anselm on the Ontological Status of 
Choice,” forthcoming in International Philosophical Quarterly. My analogy for choice is some-
one passing another runner in a race. I take the “passing” to be a genuine event, but one 
which does not produce anything with additional ontological status beyond the runners 
and (allowing for a liberal ontology) their capacity to run and their “runnings.”
24I take it that Anselm’s analysis—foreshadowing Robert Kane’s (Rogers, Anselm on Free-
dom, 99–101)—has an advantage over some other forms of libertarianism in that he is able 
to give a parsimonious explanation for the choice in terms of preceding factors. Of course, 
he cannot give a complete explanation in the sense of demonstrating why the preference for 
one option over the other had to be, since the agent could choose either option. That is just 
what libertarianism entails.
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other similar decision method) that “made the choice,” not you, the agent. 
For myself, I find Anselm’s analysis fits well with experience. In any case, 
it seems to me that if Anselm is to maintain the classical position that all 
things and powers are made by God, and also to hold that the choice to 
sin is not produced by God, then he must maintain that the choice to sin 
is not, itself, a thing or a power. And it still seems to me, despite McCann’s 
efforts to defend the contrary, that there are excellent reasons to insist that 
God does not will the act of sin.
McCann’s Unpleasant God
In an earlier paper I charged that God, on McCann’s portrayal, while not 
Himself a sinner, must nonetheless be an unloving deceiver; unloving be-
cause He wishes ill to some of His created agents and a deceiver because 
He deceives.25 Were McCann a universalist, then the charge of painting a 
picture of an unloving God could be somewhat mitigated. Then we might 
say that God wishes a temporary ill to some of His created agents, but in 
the final analysis He wishes all to be saved. (I will note below that I do not 
think this move fully succeeds.) McCann is not a universalist. He asks, 
“Could a loving God possibly will not only the existence of [the repro-
bate], but also the very decisions on their part in which they continually 
turn aside from him, as well as the final reprobation to which they are 
condemned?” He believes it is possible. He sets out the traditional view 
that the greatest evil suffered by the damned is being separated from God. 
“But if this is the greatest evil of damnation, then no one who ends that 
way is treated unfairly, for this separation is precisely what one chooses 
by insisting on a life of rebellion rather than seeking reconciliation with 
God.”26 But if this is a defense of divine love, I do not understand the argu-
ment. God prefers that these sinners be damned rather than not. He could 
will them to choose well and be saved, without, in McCann’s view, any 
infringement on their free will, and He does not. He produces their act of 
rebellion. Perhaps there is some definition of “fair” by which it is fair to 
create a vessel fit for wrath complete with its sinful choices and then visit 
wrath upon it, but “loving” seems the wrong word to use here.27
25Rogers, “God is Not the Author of Sin,” 303–305. Here I had taken McCann’s state-
ments (“The Author of Sin?” 151–152) to the effect that to sin is to disobey the command 
of God and that “[God’s] ordinances are the source of moral obligation” to be expressions 
of some form of divine command theory. I had noted standard difficulties with that view 
and opposed to it the traditional position that all good is a reflection of the nature of God. 
McCann (“God, Sin, and Rogers on Anselm,” 423–424) says that he does not hold the views 
I attributed to him in this regard. I grant that it may be consistent to root moral obligation 
in divine command while still holding that, ultimately, good of any description consists 
in a reflection of the divine nature, and I regret it if I mischaracterized McCann’s position.
26McCann, “The Author of Sin?” 154.
27The issue of unmerited grace for the post-lapsarian human agent might arise here. 
Anselm follows Augustine in the view that God does not offer grace to all. I argue that 
this position is not a load-bearing member in his theoretical edifice and—unlike within the 
Augustinian system—could be altered without any damage to the overall view (Rogers, 
Anselm on Freedom, 141–145).
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Some philosophers have argued that the eternal damnation of the 
reprobate provides otherwise unobtainable goods for the universe as a 
whole. This does not respond to the charge of God’s preferring perma-
nent and irremediable ill regarding the damned, and hence being unlov-
ing at least towards them.28 But perhaps it is justified as necessary for the 
overall good? The Augustinian, Neoplatonic tradition to which Anselm 
subscribed emphasized the value of having the most compossible kinds of 
things. Could we argue that damned souls are necessary to round out the 
number of kinds in the universe? But including the reprobate as a “kind” 
is peculiar. On the Great Chain of Being we do not carve out separate links 
for the healthy dog, the slightly unwell dog, the very sick dog, and the dog 
at death’s door.29 They are not separate kinds of things, but rather they 
are all dogs, and the last three are just “fallings away” from the dog as he 
ought to be. It is equally peculiar to insist upon the damned as a separate 
kind necessary to fulfilling the order and beauty of the universe.
Thomas proposes that the existence of the damned allows for the 
presence of God’s justice in punishing them.30 But it is difficult to see the 
presence of such justice as a proper justification for creating the reprobate. 
God’s justice in rewarding the saved is essentially the same phenomenon, 
so isn’t that enough justice?31 Don’t—at least in a Thomist universe—the 
souls in Purgatory suffer for their sins? Won’t that suffice to exhibit justice? 
What about a world in which no one is damned, but it is the case that God 
would punish the reprobate were there any? The justice is “there,” it just 
does not need to be visited as punishment upon anyone. The most funda-
mental problem, of course, has to do with the understanding of justice in 
this case. It is God who creates the reprobate in their sins. Having made 
the vessel fit for wrath, it is difficult to see that the creator is just in blam-
ing the vessel for being fit for wrath. It is being punished for doing as God 
made it to do. Is this justice?32
It is hard to see that God is not being unloving towards the damned. 
What of His deceit? I argued that the meaning of commanding implies 
that the one who issues the command believes it is possible for the com-
mand to be obeyed and wants it to be obeyed. I am speaking here of seri-
ous and genuine commands, not commands made in jest or on stage etc. 
28McCann notes, as would Anselm, that even for the damned it is better that they should 
exist than not (“The Author of Sin?” 155). But surely it would be even better for them to ex-
ist and be saved. On the Anselmian model God could not see to it that sinners are saved 
without interfering with their freedom, but on McCann’s understanding, God could simply 
produce in the otherwise damned the choices necessary for salvation.
29I offer a brief defense of the idea of the Great Chain in “The Medieval Approach to 
Aardvarks, Escalators, and God,” The Journal of Value Inquiry 27 (1993): 41–53.
30McCann makes this suggestion briefly (“The Author of Sin?” 154–155).
31True, the blessed are saved through grace, but nonetheless they deserve their reward 
due to their merits. ST Supplementum Tertiae Partis Q.87, Art. 2.
32One might argue that God’s justice is not our justice. Then the appropriate dictum 
would be: “Regarding that about which one cannot speak one should keep silent.” Neither 
McCann nor I seem likely to embrace that advice.
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Someone issuing an apparently serious command who does not believe 
it is possible for the command to be obeyed or who does not want the 
command to be obeyed is behaving deceitfully towards those who are the 
recipients of the command. On McCann’s view moral obligation for the 
created agent arises from the commands issued by God. It is praiseworthy 
to obey the divine commands and blameworthy to disobey them. But, in 
the case of the sinner, God knows that the sinner cannot obey the com-
mand, since God Himself will produce the act of sin. And God, with His 
consequent will, wills that the sinner should sin. He does not, all things 
considered, want to be obeyed. That being the case, I argued that in issu-
ing commands which He knows cannot be obeyed and which He does not 
want to have obeyed, McCann’s God is a deceiver.33 McCann argues, to 
the contrary, that it is just false to suppose that in all (or the vast majority 
of)34 cases the utterance of apparently serious commands implies that the 
commander believes it is possible that the command should be obeyed 
and truly wants to be obeyed. He gives examples in defense of his claim.
He writes, as an example of the command which cannot be obeyed,
An army commander may order a unit to take a certain objective even if he 
believes it is impossible for the unit to do so—for example, if he believes that a 
mere attempt to take the objective is important to the army’s overall success.  
Furthermore, experienced troops know that such commands are sometimes 
given. But that does not alter their behavior, because they also know that 
this fact does not change or diminish their obligations in any way.35
But this example does not make McCann’s case. Surely the command—
the order to be obeyed—is that the unit should try as hard as it can to take 
the objective. The command might be something like “Take the objec-
tive, or die trying!” If a lone, legless, armless member of the unit should 
survive the doomed attempt, it would be absurd to court martial him for 
insubordination in that, though he tried his hardest, he failed to do the 
impossible and take the objective. He did not disobey the command and 
is not blameworthy. In doing everything in his power, he did obey the 
command under any reasonable understanding of the command. And it 
would add another layer of absurdity if the commander (analogous to 
McCann’s God) were to blame the soldiers for disobedience when the rea-
son the unit cannot succeed is because he, their commander himself, is 
deliberately blowing them to pieces as they try to take their objective. The 
non-absurd understanding of the command involves the qualification, 
“. . . or die trying!” precisely because the meaning of commanding entails 
33Rogers, “God is Not the Author of Sin,” 303–305.
34If the ingenious philosopher comes up with the “one in a million” case in which the 
serious command does not imply these tacit entailments, I do not think this really affects 
my argument, unless it can be shown in a principled way that divine commands should 
be expected to exhibit this rare and anomalous feature, such that God giving them is not 
deceitful.
35McCann “God, Sin, and Rogers on Anselm,” 425.
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that the commander believes it is possible for the command to be obeyed. 
Note, too, that the army commander cannot rule out the possibility of a 
miracle, and so, unlike God, he cannot be sure that it is really impossible 
to take the objective. Moreover, if he wants his soldiers to try their hardest 
to take the objective, he may well attempt to issue his command in such 
a way that the soldiers believe that he, their commander, believes it to be 
possible. But that is deception. So this is not a case where someone issues 
a serious command, which does not intend to deceive, but which the one 
commanding believes to be impossible to execute. McCann’s example il-
lustrates my claim rather than disproving it.
What of the point that the very giving of a command implies that the 
commander wants the command to be obeyed? McCann offers the counter-
example of the difficult and much-discussed story of Abraham and Isaac, 
but he allows that God apparently does want Abraham to demonstrate 
a willingness to obey. To say that this is not an obvious counterexample 
would be a gross understatement given the mental energy that has been 
devoted to puzzling over it down the ages. But there are other examples. 
McCann suggests that a “parent might command a rebellious child to per-
form an action A, not because he wants A done but because he knows the 
command will induce the child to perform B instead, which is the action 
the parent really wants performed. And again, this situation does not take 
away the child’s obligation to do A.”36 But this is not a counterexample to 
my claim at all. The parent here is deceiving the child. In order for the trick 
to work, the child has to be deceived. Presumably the very issuing of the 
command deceives the child because the child assumes that the meaning 
of commanding entails that the parent wants the command to be obeyed. 
My claim was not that no one could issue a command which he does not 
really want to have obeyed. My claim was that, given the meaning of a 
command, it would be deceitful for someone to issue an apparently seri-
ous command which he does not want to have obeyed.
McCann’s point that the child has an obligation to do A is also doubt-
ful. The doubt occurs because of cases like this: the child, unknown to 
the parent, has undergone a conversion involving seeing and internal-
izing the fact that his parents love him. Now the child recognizes the 
wisdom of obedience to his parents. Suppose he overhears Mom and Dad 
talking about the trick they’ve played to get him to do B, which is the ac-
tion they want him to perform. They note that it is the best action under 
the circumstances. It will promote his well-being and gladden their pa-
rental hearts. Should the reformed child really do A, knowing his parents 
want him to do B? Abelard takes it as obvious that, when you know that 
God wants to be disobeyed, the right thing to do is to disobey.37 Myself, 
I think McCann is probably correct about the child’s obligation, which is 
36Ibid.
37Ethics or Know Thyself, chapter 3. I am suspicious of this conclusion, having first run 
across it in the mouth of the devil in C. S.Lewis’s Perelandra.
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a powerful reason why parents should avoid getting tricky. Parents who 
do use such trickery may rightly be blamed for their deceit, it seems to 
me. And so again, McCann’s example illustrates my point rather than 
disproving it.
McCann concludes his discussion regarding divine deception by not-
ing that the commands issued by God are in accord with His antecedent 
will, just not with His consequent will. For example, “In itself, adultery 
must surely be displeasing to God. . . . It may be, however, that a better 
world overall will result if certain adulteries occur.”38 Certainly, God per-
mits adultery and can bring about great good from it. But God does not 
command merely that some or most adultery be avoided. He commands 
that adultery be avoided. This seems a serious command such that one 
who deliberately disobeys is ipso facto blameworthy. If, as Anselm insists, 
God is the Truth in which all that is true participates, and the standard 
for the Rightness to which all that is right conforms, He cannot command 
one thing, but will another. He cannot command that all should avoid 
adultery and then produce in some the choice to commit adultery.
McCann concludes his discussion of deceit by noting that “any account 
on which God knew in creating the world that it was this world he was 
creating and not some other, must be an account on which every bit of 
wrongdoing that ever occurs is in accord with his consequent will.”39 
Quite right. Anselm does not offer an account “on which God knew in 
creating the world that it was this world he was creating.” God knows 
what we choose only because we actually choose it. Our choices—the prefer-
ences by which we opt for this over that—are not created by God, either 
individually or as part of the entire world-package. God creates this world 
taking into account the choices of free created agents, but logically He 
does not know, absent our choosing, what it is we choose. Logically, not 
temporally. No Open Theism here! Anselm adopts isotemporalism—all 
times, past, present, and future, are real and ontologically equal—and 
God sees all that happens “at once” in His eternity.40
Problems with McCann’s Theodicy of Sin
McCann’s theodicy focuses on a different question than Anselm’s. Anselm 
proposes a free will theodicy, and asks why God permits sin. His answer 
is that in order to be genuine imagines Dei we must be able to choose from 
ourselves, but this means genuinely open, morally significant options. Yes, 
God can bring good out of the sins, but still, human agents could and 
should have consistently chosen well. In that case the world would be at 
least as good as, and perhaps better than, it is.41 Alas, they did not. The 
38McCann “God, Sin, and Rogers on Anselm,” 426.
39Ibid.
40Rogers, Anselm on Freedom, chapters 8 and 9. See especially 171–176.
41This last point is extrapolation on my part since Anselm does not devote any energy 
to comparing the values of possible worlds. He is firmly rooted in the actual—a wholesome 
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ability to choose is necessary for the metaphysical stature of the created 
agent, but moral evil per se is pointless in the sense that it is not required 
for the existence of some intrinsic good. By an intrinsic good I mean some-
thing good in itself, which of itself adds to the order and beauty of the 
whole. The product of adultery may be a good person, but qua being a 
good person, not qua being the product of adultery. Surgery is a good, 
but not an intrinsic good. It is good only as a response to illness. Someone 
who valued surgery in itself would be perverse. God permits sin because 
for Him to interfere with the act of sin and its consequences (or to inter-
fere very often) would be to shut down the morally significant options 
required for freedom.
McCann’s theodicy, on the contrary, must show that it is false that “a 
completely sovereign God can accomplish all of his goals without the 
occurrence of sin.”42 He must show that sin is required for some goods, 
where it is better (or at least as good) to have both than neither. The An-
selmian certainly does not dispute that all manner of goods may have sin 
in their causal history.43 Some might be the sorts of goods that God, being 
able to do anything logically possible, could create ex nihilo without there 
being any need for sin. So, for example, one might point to knowledge or 
appreciation of the good, or joy in friendship with God, brought about by 
comparison with having lived, and then repented of, the sinful life. In an 
earlier paper I suggested that the knowledge, the appreciation, and the 
joy, being genuine independent phenomena, could be made by God ex 
nihilo without the causal history of the sin and repentance.44 I should have 
added that this result could be achieved without deception on God’s part. 
The created agent might come into being on the doorstep of heaven with a 
set of memories which he recognizes as false. I imagine something rather 
like that feeling you get when you awaken from a terrible dream in which 
you have done something dreadful and the whole world has turned dark. 
There is that wonderful sense of relief and pleasure born of the realization 
that it wasn’t real. The possibility of this scenario does not challenge the 
role of sin in Anselm’s theodicy, since the actual ability to choose contrib-
utes to the metaphysical stature of the agent, which Anselm deems to be 
so important. But it does pose a challenge to a theodicy which justifies sin 
through its possible consequences.
McCann, however, insists that there are some goods for which actual 
sin is necessary. He writes, “the good that I claim arises out of sin consists 
place, it seems to me. I think the extrapolation is legitimate in that he never suggests that 
the evil of sin is necessary for some greater good and seems to suggest the contrary in De 
casu diaboli 25. On the other hand, De Veritate 8 seems to argue that whatever evils God per-
mits, He does so for a good purpose. Still, it is noteworthy that in all his discussion of the 
Incarnation he does not argue that the original fall was fortunate.
42McCann, “God, Sin, and Rogers on Anselm,” 426.
43As a striking example, the Incarnation is certainly good, and, on Anselm’s view, the 
fall made it necessary. It does not follow that an unfallen world would be worse overall.
44Rogers “God is Not the Author of Sin,” 305–306.
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in two things: the defeat of the rebellion that constitutes our sinfulness, 
and the establishment of a relation of friendship with God.”45 In order 
for sin to be defeated there must be sin, and in order for repentance to be 
“true” (McCann’s term) there must be something to repent. This seems 
right. The first question, though, is: Should we believe that created agents 
and/or the world they inhabit are better (or no worse) off given sin, its de-
feat, and repentance, than they would be had God chosen to bring about 
created agents and see to it that they never chose to sin? On the one hand, I 
suspect that a sinless world is largely unimaginable to us, and so a certain 
reticence about what it would be like is appropriate. But if one engages in 
a theodicy of sin, presumably part of the job is to show, not just how sin 
might be necessary for some goods, but how, overall, the sin and conse-
quent goods produce a world which is as good as, or better than, a world 
without both. Illness is a necessary link in the causal history of the good 
of surgery. The invasion and the cutting could not be a good unless it 
were necessary to remedy some disease. But it would look, at least prima 
facie, to be a better world in which everyone stayed healthy and surgery 
was not required. If friendship with God is a good thing, why not per-
manent friendship? If it is argued, for example, that friendship lost and 
regained is preferable because of the knowledge of what the absence of 
God entails, then, again, the knowledge is an independent phenomenon 
which can be produced by God ex nihilo. Anselm certainly never suggests 
that the good angels should be pitied for never having had the experience 
of sinning themselves. They chose well when they had the option and are 
now confirmed in the friendship of God such that they can never sin. And 
good for them! If it is, all things considered, better (or as good) to have sin 
and its defeat than not to have either, we need an argument.
I do not rule out the possibility of a persuasive argument that the world 
with sin may be at least as good as the world without sin. Many philoso-
phers subscribe to one or another version of the fortunate fall thesis, and 
God in his omnipotence may bring a full complement of good out of the 
evil of sin. But it seems to me there is a fundamental paradox in McCann’s 
theodicy of sin. If I am understanding him, he argues that genuine rebel-
lion is a necessary prequel to true repentance and hence to friendship 
with God. McCann does not spell out what repentance consists in, but 
ordinarily we would suppose that repentance involves sorrow for the past 
deed. One who repents says, “I did wrong. I should not have done it. I 
wish I had not done it.” It is hard to see how genuine repentance would be 
possible for someone who believes McCann’s analysis of the relationship 
between God and the act of sin. One believing that he should not have 
done something likely believes that he could have done otherwise, and it 
was truly up to him that he failed to do otherwise. On McCann’s view the 
act of sin is produced by God. In McCann’s universe, if the agent is right 
in saying “I should not have done it,” then it would seem to be the case 
45McCann, “God, Sin, and Rogers on Anselm,” 428.
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that God should not have brought it about that the agent did the deed. 
But on McCann’s theodicy, the act of sin is willed by God as a necessary 
means to a greater good. The sinner who understood this ought not to say 
“I should not have done it. I wish I had not done it.” He ought to be glad 
that he did it—and that God produced his doing it. But this is paradoxi-
cal. The good which justifies God’s producing the act of sin is repentance 
and friendship with God, but someone who truly understood that God 
produces the act of sin to achieve this good could not truly repent. He, the 
agent, would not hold himself responsible, since he did what he did as the 
inevitable product of the will of God. And he would not be sorry he (and 
God) had done it, since he (and God) had to do it for the greater good to 
be produced. It seems that only someone who does not accept McCann’s 
theodicy could sincerely, coherently, repent. In McCann’s universe, for the 
good to be achieved, the sinner would have to be deceived about the na-
ture of things.
Of course, on McCann’s account, the repentance is also caused by God. 
The whole drama of rebellion against God, repentance, and the return to 
friendship with God is a play written entirely by God. There is only one 
will that acts decisively, and that is God’s. Of course the characters choose 
and act, but they choose and act as God wills that they should choose and 
act. A rebellion against Himself, willed and produced by God, does not 
seem like real rebellion, and repentance on the part of His mock rebels, 
willed and produced by God for what He has willed them to do, does not 
seem like real repentance. I do not see that the good which McCann points 
to as the justification for God’s producing the act of sin is really to be had 
in McCann’s universe.
On the other hand, there is a widely-recognized practical danger in 
adopting McCann’s view, and it needs to be remembered. At least since 
Augustine’s day people have worried that a belief that God produces all 
choices will encourage moral laxness in individuals and harm to society 
as a whole. It can take effort to walk the narrow path, and if you are con-
vinced that whatever you actually choose and do is what God is willing 
you to choose and do, and all for the best, then this belief might provide 
a solid excuse not to make the effort to behave well. And aren’t we al-
ways looking for excuses? Intuitively this strikes me as a very plausible 
concern, and there is some evidence from experimental psychology sup-
porting the intuition.46 Suppose there is a greater risk of behaving badly 
for the individual and hence harm to society in general in adopting Mc-
Cann’s view. (Of course I do not say that all who accept it behave badly! 
I acknowledged in the beginning that Augustine and Thomas may well 
share McCann’s position, and I do not doubt that many, many who adhere 
46Azim F. Shariff, Johathan Schooler, and Kathleen D. Vohs, “The Hazards of Claiming 
to Have Solved the Hard Problem of Free Will,” in Are We Free?: Psychology and Free Will, 
ed. John Baer, James C. Kaufman, and Roy F. Baumeister (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008), 181–204.
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to it are exemplary human beings.) Then we can do a little Pascalian wa-
gering to see that the Anselmian position is the safest bet.47
Suppose that McCann is correct. If we believe that our choices are pro-
duced by God, we enjoy the benefit of believing the truth, but we run a 
greater risk of behaving badly. This might or might not produce harm to 
the individual and society, but we cannot count it as a harm overall, since 
the belief and its consequences, on McCann’s account, are produced by 
God for a greater good. If we believe that our choices are not produced 
by God we suffer the harm of not believing the truth, but again, this can-
not be counted as a harm overall, since the belief is produced by God to 
achieve a greater good. And we may (God willing, of course) enjoy the 
benefit of being encouraged to make the effort to behave well, which will 
benefit others, too. So if McCann is correct, there is no ultimate harm done 
whatever we believe, as is to be expected in a world in which absolutely 
everything is produced by God for some good purpose.
But suppose that Anselm is correct. In the Anselmian universe, if we 
believe that we bear ultimate responsibility for our morally significant 
choices, we have the advantages of believing the truth and of being en-
couraged to make the effort to behave well. If we believe that God is the 
ultimate source of all our choices, we suffer the disadvantage of believing 
falsehood and we run a greater risk of behaving badly. So if we side with 
Anselm we cannot lose. In the McCann universe our Anselmian belief 
is false but ultimately beneficial and in the Anselm universe it is true 
and ultimately beneficial. If we side with McCann, and he is correct, we 
don’t gain anything over what we would if we sided with Anselm, since 
whichever way we go constitutes God’s producing our belief to achieve 
the better outcome. But we run the risk of losing big time. If ours is an 
Anselmian universe, our belief is not only false but also involves the risk 
that we may do ourselves serious harm by failing to make the effort to 
behave well. Better bet on Anselm. The matter can be put succinctly with 
this rhetorical question: Which would you rather tell your 13 year old as 
he heads off to Middle School: that it’s up to him to make good choices 
and he must make every effort to behave well, or that it’s up to him to 
make good choices and he must make every effort to behave well, but that 
whatever he actually ends up doing, God willed him to do it in order to 
achieve some greater good?
A Final Note on Safety
In my earlier paper criticized by McCann, I granted that if we say that 
our choices are, in the last analysis, up to us, we must allow the possi-
bility that we will choose badly with dire and everlasting consequences. 
Anselm does argue that the blessed are sure of continuing in the friend-
ship of God, since they no longer see anything extraneous to desire. So 
47In engaging in Pascalian wagering I am following a suggestion from my research as-
sistant, Joseph Fitt.
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we can reach a point where the danger is over and we can be certain of 
our beatitude.48 McCann holds that if it is ultimately up to God what we 
choose, then, in this life, we may enjoy “the security of the believer: the 
assurance that, having once invested full trust in God to see to their salva-
tion, that trust will not be betrayed, so that their ultimate union with him 
is guaranteed.” For God to produce the repentant sinner’s act of choosing 
to rescind his faith in God, “God has to drop the ball: he must, after he has 
been accorded full trust by the sinner to secure his eternal destiny, betray 
that trust, by willing that the sinner turn away from him. A loving father 
would never do that.”49
Were McCann a universalist his claim about what God as a loving fa-
ther would or would not do might be more persuasive (though still sub-
ject to the points made above). In that case he could hold that the acts of 
sin God produces in his created agents ultimately lead to the good for all 
of those agents. God wills the good for all of his children and their sin is 
the necessary means to secure it. But McCann is not a universalist. He 
suggests Aquinas’s point about divine justice, and goes on to say,
I think, however, that our real concern about the lost is not how they are 
recompensed for their lives. What is troubling, rather, is that God should 
create such beings at all, much less will their performance of the very ac-
tions through which they reject him. It may be argued, however, that even 
here God’s love is at work. The lost are, after all, full participants in secur-
ing their tragic destiny; and while a life ruined by final rebellion is morally 
indefensible, it is still morally meaningful.50
McCann, then, holds that God does bring it about that some are lost. 
And it seems to be an evident empirical fact that some who had been com-
mitted to faith in Christ as their savior abandon that faith, quite possibly 
in favor of permanent rebellion. On McCann’s view this is willed by God. 
Given the facts about the human condition I simply do not see the argu-
ment connecting God’s producing all choices to the safety which McCann 
hopes for. Perhaps it may be seen as an advantage that on McCann’s view 
we can suppose that God creates the lost as lost since it is necessary to the 
overall good of the divine plan. We can take comfort in the thought that it 
is better that there should be some in Hell than not. The Anselmian holds 
that it is just bad that some, under their own steam, opt for Hell. It would 
be better if everyone were saved, and God would prefer that everyone 
48Rogers, Anselm on Freedom, 84–85. The Catechism of the Catholic Church (section 2005) 
says, “Since it belongs to the supernatural order, grace escapes our experience [emphasis in 
the original] and cannot be known except by faith. We cannot therefore rely on our feel-
ings or our works to conclude that we are justified and saved.” Roman Catholicism, then, 
would seem to preclude certainty regarding salvation. Perhaps for McCann’s thesis faith 
and hope, rather than certainty, are adequate? In that case McCann and I may not be too far 
apart regarding the appropriate attitude towards one’s own salvation.
49McCann, “God, Sin, and Rogers on Anselm,” 430.
50McCann, “The Author of Sin?” 154–155.
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be saved.51 So I do not see that McCann’s universe is less dangerous than 
Anselm’s. And I find it more comforting to believe that the reality of Hell 
is our doing, not God’s.52
University of Delaware
51Anselm himself holds that God does not extend grace to all the fallen, but the Ansel-
mian—one who accepts Anselm’s overall system—could reject that one detail without any 
of the rest of the construction being shaken.
52Possibly the most comforting picture would entail a universalism such that those who 
freely choose God are saved as free agents, and those who freely reject God are demoted 
to agents without Anselmian freedom and made to be saved. That way everyone is saved 
and some are able to enjoy the elevated metaphysical stature which free will bestows. But 
scripture and Church teaching must trump comfort, it seems to me.
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